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This article investigates the conceptual and theoretical implications of the logic of habit for
the path-dependence approach. In the existing literature, we see two different logics of
action associated with two distinct models of path dependence: the logic of consequences
(instrumental rationality) is linked with utilitarian paths (i.e. increasing returns) and the
logic of appropriateness (normative rationality) constitutes normative paths (normative
lock-in). However, this study suggests that despite its popularity, the path-dependence
approach remains underspeciﬁed owing to its exclusion or neglect of the logic of habit,
which constitutes a distinct mechanism of reproduction or self-reinforcement in the
institutional world. This article, therefore, introduces the notion of the ‘habitual path’
as a different model of path dependence. Although the idea of the habitual path is
complementary with the existing models, owing to its distinctive notions of agency and
mechanisms of path reproduction, it offers a different interpretation of continuity or
regularity. Thus, by enriching the path-dependence approach, the notion of the habitual
path would contribute to our comprehension of continuities and discontinuities in the
political world.
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Introduction
Although the notion of path dependence is associated with historical institutional-
ism (e.g. Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Pierson, 1996; Blyth, 2002; Greener, 2005), it
has become a highly popular concept in the social sciences, and is utilized by various
institutional perspectives (e.g. rational choice and sociological institutionalisms)
and in policy analyses. It is, however, deﬁned and applied rather differently
throughout the literature (see also Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). For instance, in
one deﬁnition, path dependence implies that ‘what happened at an earlier point in
time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later
point in time’ (Sewell, 1996: 262–263). For Levi, path dependence suggests that
‘once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are
very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice’ (1997: 28).
Berman (1998: 380) argues that in a path-dependent process, choices made at time
T shape or inﬂuence choices made at time T + 1. Another highly cited deﬁnition
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states that ‘path dependence characterizes speciﬁcally those historical sequences in
which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains
that have deterministic properties’ (Mahoney, 2000: 507). More recently, David
(2007: 92) proposes that path dependence refers to ‘a dynamic pattern or continuity
that evolves as a result of its own past’.1
In addition to different conceptualizations, we see distinct types of path depen-
dence in the literature. An overview of the applications of the path-dependence
approach by the existing institutional and policy analyses suggests that we can
identify two major types or models of path dependence: utilitarian and normative,
and that each of these models is associated with a distinct logic of action: the logic
of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness, respectively. Thus, for
the existing models or types of path dependence, paths are constituted by either
cost-beneﬁt calculus or by normative, ideational considerations.
This study, however, argues that existing models ignore or neglect the logic of
habit and habitual routines, and as a result, the path-dependence approach remains
underspeciﬁed. Thus, this work introduces the ‘habitual path’ as a unique model of
path dependence and shows that this notion is discrete enough to be regarded as a
separate explanatory tool. Far from rejecting the existing models, this study intends
to broaden and empower the path-dependence approach. By enriching the analy-
tical content of the path-dependence approach, the notion of the habitual path
would enhance our understanding of history-dependent processes and patterns.
Therefore, it would be rewarding to include the habitual model of path dependence
in our theoretical and conceptual toolkits.
The article proceeds as follows: the next section presents the main assumptions and
premises of the existing variants of path dependence. Then, the article presents the
main features of the habitual path to explain the third model of path dependence.
The concluding section summarizes the study’s main arguments and discusses some
implications for institutional and policy analyses, as well as some possible counter-
arguments.
The existing models of path dependence
In the existing path-dependence literature, one can ﬁnd several typological analyses
of path dependence. Many of them suggest that path dependence entails both self-
reinforcing and reactive sequences (e.g. see Mahoney, 2000; Bennett and Elman,
2006; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006; Beyer, 2010). For Mahoney (2000: 508–509),
self-reinforcing sequences refers to the ‘formation and long-term reproduction
of a given institutional pattern’, while reactive sequences stand for ‘chains of
1 For further discussion on the notion of path dependence in several ﬁelds (e.g. technology and economic
history, institutional economics, historical sociology, political science, and organization studies), see, for
instance, David (1985, 2007), North (1990), Arthur (1994), Mahoney (2000, 2001), Pierson (2000, 2004),
Peters (2005), Peters et al. (2005), Bennett and Elman (2006), Page (2006), Mahoney and Schensul (2006),
Boas (2007), Sydow et al. (2009), Vergne and Durand (2010), and Dobusch and Schüßler (2013).
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temporarily ordered and causally connected events’.” As Mahoney states (2000:
509), in reactive sequences ‘each event within the sequence is in part a reaction to
temporally antecedent events’.
However, other studies exclude reactive sequences from the deﬁnition of path
dependence (e.g. see Pierson, 2000, 2004; Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne and Durand,
2010; Dobusch and Schüßler, 2013). It is argued that each event or step in any
temporal sequence can be linked to each other in a chain of causation. Thus,
because any antecedent event can be linked to subsequent events, almost any
non-reinforcing event sequence can be treated as a reactive sequence.2This raises the
problem of falsiﬁability. Given such limitations or difﬁculties, this work also limits
path dependence to ‘self-reproducing’ sequences and processes.
Table 1 presents a comparison of the two highly discussed and frequently
employed models of path dependence in the extant literature: utilitarian and
normative.3As seen, while these models differ in terms of the logic of action and the
mechanisms of path reproduction, they have similar conceptions of human agency
and of social action.
Utilitarian model
The utilitarian model of path dependence is associated with the logic of con-
sequentiality. As March and Olsen observe, consequential or calculative logic
asserts that ‘action is choice, [and] choice is made in terms of expectations about its
consequences’ (1984: 741). This model assumes that human agents have ﬁxed and
Table 1. The models of path dependence
Model Logic of action Prevailing conception of agency Mechanism of reproduction
I: Utilitarian Consequentiality Deliberative, teleological,
reﬂective, sentient, strategic
Increasing returns
(utilitarian lock-in)
II: Normative Appropriateness Deliberative, teleological,
reﬂective, sentient
Legitimation (ideational,
normative lock-in)
2 For further criticisms of reactive sequences, see Sydow et al. (2009: 698). For a useful brief discussion
of the criticisms of reactive sequences, see Mahoney and Schensul (2006).
3 Mahoney (2000) identiﬁes two more types of reproductive, self-reinforcing path-dependent processes
or sequences: functional and power mechanisms. In the functionalist account, institutional or policy pat-
terns are reproduced simply because they serve a particular function within a larger system. Thus, path
reproduction is due to the functional consequences of that institution or policy. In a power framework,
institutional reproduction is due to support by a powerful elite group. These frameworks, however, can be
regarded as derivatives or variants of the utilitarian, consequentialist model. For instance, in the power
framework, powerful or inﬂuential actors support andmaintain the institutional or policy path because they
beneﬁt from the existing institutional or policy arrangements (see Mahoney, 2000: 521–522). In other
words, the utilitarian considerations of powerful actors sustain path reproduction and maintenance.
Therefore, in this study, I discuss the utilitarian and normative frameworks as two major distinct models of
path dependence.
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prior preferences or interests, and they are primarily concerned with maximizing
their utilities. Agents are also imagined as instrumentally rational, in the sense
that they choose among available options by engaging in utilitarian cost-beneﬁt
calculations or assessments. Therefore, it is assumed that agents consciously create
institutions to increase means-ends efﬁciency and to maximize collective welfare
(Bates, 1988; North, 1990;Weingast, 2002). Bates, for instance, observes that in the
contractarian, rational-choice variant of institutionalism, ‘[i]nstitutions are treated
as a means for resolving collective dilemmas. Collective dilemmas arise when
choices made by rational individuals lead to outcomes that no one prefers’ (1988:
387), for example, prisoner’s dilemma situations. Likewise, Weingast notes that
‘[individuals] often need institutions to help capture gains from cooperation. In the
absence of institutions, individuals often face a social dilemma that is a situation
where their behavior makes all worse off’ (2002: 670). Thus, in teleological and
instrumentalist conceptions of social action, agency is presumed to be highly
intentional, reﬂective, and strategic.
The main mechanism of continuity or path reproduction4 in the utilitarian,
consequentialist model of path dependence is increasing returns, which are deﬁned
as self-reinforcing, positive feedback processes (see David, 1985; Romer, 1986;
Arthur, 1990, 1994; Krugman, 1991; Pierson, 1996, 2000; Dobusch and Schüßler,
2013). Pierson, who provides the most systematic studies of this notion in political
science, states:
In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same
path increases with each move down that path. This is because the relative beneﬁts
of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time.
To put it in a different way, the costs of exit – of switching to some previously
plausible alternative – rise (2000: 263; see also Levi, 1997: 28).
The logic of consequentiality is evident in the above statements: the growing
beneﬁts that a certain path generates with its continued adoption create further
incentives for instrumentally rational agents to maintain the existing path. In other
words, self-reproduction is an outcome of the utilitarian considerations of rational
actors.
Speciﬁc conditions or sources of increasing returns are identiﬁed as large set-up or
ﬁxed costs, learning effects, coordination effects (network externality) and adaptive
expectations (see North, 1990; Arthur, 1994: 112; Pierson, 2000: 254; Sydow et al.,
2009; Dobusch and Schüßler, 2013: 621). Because setting up a new institution is
costly, it would be preferable to maintain existing institutional arrangements. Thus,
large set-up costs provide inducements for actors to invest in existing institutional
patterns. Fixed costs refer to a decline in production cost per unit as output
increases, also generating a lure for path maintenance. Learning effects refers to a
4 The notion of ‘mechanisms of reproduction’ refers to ‘the factors that are sufﬁcient to keep an outcome
in place after the factors that produce it have disappeared’ (Soifer, 2012: 1577).
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situation where the use of a technology generates greater efﬁciency in the reuse of
that technology. In other words, learning cultivates the knowledge and skills that
enhance efﬁciency. As Pierson states, ‘with repetition, individuals learn how to
use products more effectively, and their experiences are likely to spur further
innovations in the product or in related activities’ (2000: 254). Coordination effects
occur when the beneﬁts an actor receives from a policy or technology increase as
others also use the same option. In other words, a given option is more attractive to
maintain if adopted by others (also known as network externality). Adaptive
expectations reference how expectations adapt to experience in the sense that
the success of an option would change expectations and result in actions that
continue to follow that direction (i.e. self-fulﬁlling anticipation), reinforcing the
existing pattern.
A classic and most prominent example of increasing returns is the story of the
QWERTY keyboard layout (see David, 1985). Although it is regarded as less
efﬁcient than the one designed by August Dvorak, QWERTY was able to lock itself
in. QWERTY was introduced in the late 19th century, while Dvorak’s relatively
simpler and more efﬁcient keyboard was initiated in the 1930s. It is asserted that
owing to technical interrelatedness, economies of scale and the quasi-irreversibility
of investment, it became difﬁcult to switch from the previously introduced
QWERTY keyboard to the Dvorak format, regardless of its relative efﬁciency
(David, 1985).5
The notion of increasing returns has two major implications. First, path con-
tinuity is regarded as a matter of a utilitarian cost-beneﬁt assessment (see also
Greener, 2007: 101; Beyer, 2010: 3). Second, regarding the prevailing conception of
human agency, agents are assumed to be intentional, reﬂective and strategic as they
follow or maintain the existing path. Although agents are not expected to return to
initial conditions or shift to another path easily, path maintenance is considered a
conscious, rational, and strategic choice. As Mahoney also observes, in a utilitarian
framework, ‘actors rationally choose to reproduce institutions – including perhaps
sub-optimal institutions because any potential beneﬁts of transformation are out-
weighed by the costs’ (2000: 517).
Normative model
Normative paths are linked to the norm-based logic of appropriateness, which
assumes that actions are primarily guided by rules, norms, and identities rather than
by material interests or expectations (March and Olsen, 1989; see also Boudon,
2003; Schmidt, 2010). March and Olsen deﬁne an institution as a ‘relatively stable
collection of practices and rules deﬁning appropriate behavior for speciﬁc groups of
actors in speciﬁc situations’ (1998: 948). They further note that these practices and
5 For discussion of similar cases of increasing returns in technology markets, regional clustering, and
organizations see Arthur (1994), Sydow et al. (2009), and Dobusch and Schüßler (2013).
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rules are ‘embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that
explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated
with them’ (1998: 948). Thus, as a set of norms, rituals, values, meanings, and
procedures, institutions provide a logic of appropriateness, which constitutes
identities and interests, and consequently shapes agents’ behavior (Olsen, 2009: 9).
In an institutional environment, then, agents are assumed to be motivated
by ideational concerns such as legitimacy, reputation, and prestige (March and
Olsen, 1984, 1989; Hall, 1993: 46–49). In other words, actors are not only homo
economicus but also homo sociologicus, which suggests that agents also observe
collective understandings such as socially shared ideas, norms, and values. Behavior
is treated as rule or norm driven rather than choice driven.
Although the normative model is based on the logic of appropriateness, which is
set against the logic of consequences of the utilitarian model, interestingly, these
models of path dependence share a similar conception of agency. For the normative
model, in institutionalized settings actors ‘consciously’ follow the associated rules,
rituals, and norms and act according to the logic of appropriateness rather than just
trying to maximize their exogenously deﬁned utilitarian interests. However, the
normative model also accepts that agents are concerned with the consequences
or outcomes of their actions. It is assumed that agents conform to the rules of
appropriateness to avoid certain undesirable outcomes such as opprobrium.
This sounds similar to the outcome-oriented, instrumentalist logic dominant in the
utilitarian model. To put it differently, rule or norm-following behavior is also
based on consequential thinking. In treating agents as norm or rule followers
and role players, this model, too, assumes agents to be deliberative, teleological,
reﬂective, and sentient (see also Olsen, 2009: 9). As Pouliot also contends, ‘the logic
of appropriateness is a reﬂexive process whereby agents need to ﬁgure out
what behavior is appropriate to a situation’ (2008: 262; see also Risse, 2000: 6;
Hopf, 2010).
Concerning path reproduction, legitimation constitutes the primary mechanism
of path continuity rather than materialist ‘increasing returns’ logic (see Krasner,
1988: 76–77; March and Olsen, 1989; Orren, 1991; Mahoney, 2000: 523; Blyth,
2001; Campbell, 2002; Cox, 2004; Olsen, 2009: 13). March and Olsen, for
instance, argue that ‘[i]nstitutions preserve themselves, partly by being resistant to
many forms of change, partly by developing their own criteria of appropriateness
and success, resource distribution, and constitutional rules’ (1989: 55). Regarding
the role of legitimation in path reproduction, Mahoney states:
In a legitimation framework, institutional reproduction is grounded in actors’
subjective orientations and beliefs about what is appropriate or morally correct.
Institutional reproduction occurs because actors view an institution as legitimate
and thus voluntarily opt for its reproduction. Beliefs in the legitimacy of an
institution may range from active moral approval to passive acquiescence in the
face of the status quo. Whatever the degree of support, however, legitimation
explanations assume the decision of actors to reproduce an institution derives
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from their self-understandings about what is the right thing to do, rather than from
utilitarian rationality, system functionality, or elite power (2000: 523).
Similarly, Olsen states that ‘rules are followed because they are seen as legitimate’
(2009: 13). Thus, for the normative model, agents stick to a certain path not
because of an expected utility down the path but primarily because of belief in the
‘appropriateness’ of the rules, ideas, values, and norms that constitute the path.
For instance, in his analysis of the persistence of the Scandinavian model of the
welfare state, Cox (2004) shows that despite several reforms since the 1990s,
its distinctiveness has remained intact owing to people’s attachment, or moral
commitment, to the idea of the ‘Scandinavian model’, which is based on a unique
combination of the values and norms of universality, solidarity, and market
independence (de-commodiﬁcation).
In brief, despite differences in terms of the logic of action and the mechanisms
of path reproduction, the existing models or types of path dependence share a
common key feature: a ‘reﬂective’ conception of social action. They all assume
human agents to be deliberative, reﬂective, and teleological. For the reﬂective
conception of social action, human agents, who are motivated by certain utilitarian,
moral or affectual factors, conduct cost-beneﬁt analyses and consciously choose
the option that is expected to achieve the highest degree of ideational or material
beneﬁts or efﬁciency (Camic, 1986: 1040; see also Pouliot, 2008).
With such a one-sided conception of social action, these models either ignore or
neglect the logic of habit and its implications for path dependence.6As Pouliot also
observes, these theories of social action ‘suffer from a representational bias in that
they focus on what agents think about [i.e. reﬂexive and conscious knowledge]
instead of what they think from’ (2008: 257). Owing to such a bias, these logics
of action emphasize ‘conscious representations’ at the expense of ‘background
know-how’, which ‘informs practice in an inarticulate fashion’ (Pouliot, 2008:
258). This tendency is unfortunate because the logic of habit is quite relevant to
institutionalized settings. As Hopf puts forward, institutionalized settings, in gen-
eral, ‘are likely sites for the operation of the logic of habit because of their associated
routines, standard operating procedures, and relative isolation from competing
ideological structures’ (2010: 547). The following section illustrates the notion
of the habitual path and suggests that it constitutes a distinct model of path
dependence.
Habitual path dependence
Weber (1978: 24–26) identiﬁes four different ideal types of social action: Purposively
or instrumentally rational (zweckrational) action is motivated by desired or calcu-
lated ends; value rational (wertrational) action is based on normative or ethical
6 This observation is also valid for other types of reproductive processes, such as the functional and
power mechanisms offered by Mahoney (2000).
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commitments; affectual (emotional) action is driven by emotional factors; and
traditional action is propelled by accustomed or habituated patterns of practice.
Instrumentally, rational and value rational actions correspond to the logic of
consequences and the logic of appropriateness, respectively, and, as discussed
above, are highly utilized in institutional and policy analyses. However, traditional
action, which is connected to the logic of habit (or practical reason), has been
neglected by institutional analyses and perspectives. Rather than the purposive,
calculative, and strategic aspects of human agency, the logic of habit is concerned
with its dispositional, iterative, and practical aspects. It constitutes the stimulus
behind recurrent (usually unconscious) patterns of action or practice. As Weber
also observes, the bulk of everyday actions involves habitual actions. Unreﬂective,
non-deliberative actions are prevalent types of social action because human agents
do not always engage in calculation or deliberation before acting. As Fleetwood
asserts,
[o]ne of the well-established functions of habits is that they obviate the need for
a kind of ‘hyper-deliberation’ where agents might be assumed to engage in a
continual process of conscious deliberation over everything that came within their
orbit every moment of the day. ‘Hyper-deliberation’ would simply result in a kind
of social and mental paralysis where no one would be able to deliberate or act.
Such a process is rendered unnecessary because habits enable agents to operate
unconsciously, on a kind of ‘auto-pilot’ as it were (2008b: 187).
Thus, habitually accustomed routines and actions occupy an important place in
the social and political worlds. Although many rule-following actions are actually
based on habits (Hodgson, 2007: 107),7 the logic of habit has been largely ignored
by the extant path-dependence literature. This study, however, suggests that the
logic of habit has major implications for the path-dependence approach. As shown
below, the logic of habit constitutes self-reinforcing, reproductive sequences, and
continuities in the institutional world. This study labels those patterns as ‘habitual
paths’, which are distinct from the existing models presented above.
The notion of ‘habit’
Before moving further, some discussion on the notion of ‘habit’ would be useful.
Although habits are associated with recurrent or iterative patterns of action or
practice, they should not be reduced to sequentially correlated or linked observable
behavior. Drawing upon studies by William James (1842–1910), John Dewey
(1859–1952), and Thorstein B. Veblen (1857–1929), Hodgson distinguishes habit
from action by deﬁning the former as ‘a propensity to behave in a particular way in
a particular class of situations’ (2004: 652; see also 2006: 6; 2007: 106; Pouliot,
7 Habitual and non-habitual actions may be analytically distinct but they are not really isolated from
each other in social settings. As Camic (1986: 1045) also suggests, they might actually be mixed together in
real-life situations.
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2008: 274).8 Hodgson further argues that habit should be understood as a ‘causal
mechanism, not merely a set of correlated events’ (2004: 653). Similarly, Fleetwood
treats habit as embodied or internalized ‘disposition, capacity, or power that
generates a tendency’ (2008a: 247, original emphasis; see also Camic, 1986: 1044;
Pouliot, 2008).
It is widely accepted that habits serve key functions in social life. As Hopf
notes, habits are ‘the unreﬂective reactions we have to the world around us: our
perceptions, attitudes, emotions, and practices. They simplify the world, short-
circuiting rational reﬂection’ (2010: 544). Likewise, Becker states that ‘[h]abit
helps economize on the cost of searching for information, and of applying
the information to a new situation. And most people get mental and physical
comfort and reassurance in continuing to do what they did in the past’ (1992: 331).
Similar to long-term contracts, habits also reduce uncertainty by increasing the
predictability of future actions.
Habits are assumed to be usually unintentional, unconscious, automatic, and
unreﬂective processes (e.g. see Wegner and Bargh, 1998: 459–462; Hopf, 2010),
but several scholars warn against overly mechanical understandings of habits,
devoid of any meaning and understanding. They assert that, although unreﬂective,
dispositional, and iterative, habits also involve meaning, understanding, and
knowledge (practical). Merleau-Ponty, for instance, states, ‘We say that the body
has understood and habit been cultivated when it has absorbed a new meaning and
assimilated a fresh core of signiﬁcance’ (quoted in Crossley, 2013: 148). Dewey also
criticizes a purely mechanical approach to the notion of habit by stating that ‘[c]
oncrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging,
conceiving and reasoning that is done…. We may indeed be said to know how by
means of our habits’ (quoted in Crossley, 2013: 150).
With respect to the nexus between habit and agency, Emirbayer and Mische
(1998) observe that theoreticians of action as practices (e.g. Bourdieu and Giddens)
view habits and routinized practices as inseparable from agency. Such theories even
treat human agency as primarily ‘habitual, repetitive and taken for granted’
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 963). Even if Emirbayer and Mische ﬁnd this
approach one-sided and thus limited, they also acknowledge that habit is one of the
three constitutive elements of human agency. Situating agency within the ﬂow of
time, they conceptualize agency as
a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past
(in its ‘iterational’ or habitual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a
‘projective’ capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as
a ‘practical-evaluative’ capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects
within the contingencies of the moment) (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 962).
8 This line of thought is rooted in classical and medieval philosophy. Emirbayer and Mische (1998)
observe that several thinkers in those times, such as Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas distinguish habit from
action, treating the former as the desire, will, or disposition to act in certain ways.
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As several other analysts also indicate, in addition to reﬂexive and intentional
aspects, human agency also involves an unreﬂective, habitual dimension (see
also Becker, 1962; Arrow, 1986; Hodgson, 2004, 2006, 2007; Fleetwood, 2008a;
Akram, 2012). In the social and political worlds, agents quite often act by habit,
without calculating whether their behavior would be efﬁcient in terms of utility
maximization or be morally appropriate or legitimate in a given social setting.
Building on Bourdieu’s works, Pouliot similarly posits that
most of what people do, in world politics as in any other social ﬁeld, does not
derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reﬂection – instrumental, rule-
based, communicative, or otherwise. Instead practices are the result of inarticulate,
practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear ‘self-evident’ or com-
monsensical (2008: 258).
Habits and institutions
There is a direct linkage between habits and institutions.9 As Fleetwood suggests,
institutions ‘become internalized or embodied within agents as habits via a process of
habituation, whereupon the habits dispose agents to think and act in certain ways,
without having to deliberate’ (2008a: 247). Similarly, March and Olsen deﬁne insti-
tutionalization as ‘…structuration and routinization, which refer to the development
of codes ofmeaning, ways of reasoning, and accounts in the context of acting on them’
(1998: 948). The concept of routinization is closely related to habituation. For
Hodgson, habituation or the acquisition of habits refers to ‘the psychological
mechanism by which individuals acquire dispositions to engage in previously adopted
or acquired (rule-like) behavior’ (2006: 18). Another deﬁnition states that habituation
is ‘the process through which institutions (rules, conventions, norms, values and cus-
toms) become internalized and embodied within agents, generating the dispositions
we call habits’ (Fleetwood, 2008a: 249). Thus, as a largely unconscious process,
habituation is characterized by repetition, regularity, routinization, reinforcement, and
continuity.With these features, habituation helps a choice or action become routinized
or taken for granted. Therefore, it is asserted that institutions are linked to agency
through the mechanisms provided by habituation and habits (see Hodgson, 2006;
Fleetwood, 2008a, 2008b). In Hodgson’s words, ‘[h]abits are the constitutive material
of institutions, providing them with enhanced durability, power and normative
authority’ (2006: 7; see also 2007). Thus, habits help institutions sustain themselves.
As a disposition, propensity or tendency to act in a particular way, habits pro-
mote a certain course of action and consequently make certain choices or actions
more likely than others. Having such characteristics, habits lock certain options in,
while locking some others out. As Hopf notes,
[h]abits both evoke and suppress actions. They imply actions by giving us ready-
made responses to the world that we execute without thinking. They prevent other
9 Hodgson (2006) considers them twin concepts.
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behavior by short-circuiting any need to think about what we are doing. So
inﬁnitudes of behaviors are effectively deleted from the available repertoire of
possible actions (2010: 541).
Similarly, Barnes et al. note that ‘[b]ehavioral lock-in occurs when the behavior of
the agent (consumer or producer) is “stuck” in some sort of inefﬁciency or sub-
optimality due to habit, organizational learning, or culture’ (2004: 372).
Once agents habituate a certain option or policy, then, they would be simply
uninterested in some other options. This thinking would further reinforce the
habituated option. Swartz (2002: 66) identiﬁes predictability and regularity as
two key characteristics of habitual action. Habitual elements (e.g. internalized dis-
positions, routines, schemas, traditions, customs, and conventions) sustain and
reproduce social and political structures. Treating habituation as an important part
of human nature, Crossley states that habituation ‘is a power to conserve structures
of perception, communication and action…Moreover, it lends our lives continuity’
(2013: 146). Along the same lines, Hodgson indicates that ‘[h]abits themselves are
formed through repetition of action and thought. They are inﬂuenced by prior
activity and have durable self-sustaining qualities. Through their habits, individuals
carry the marks of their own unique history’ (2003: 164). Through habituation,
individuals acquire or develop pro-status quo cognitive frames, which shape their
awareness and interpretation of reality. Such cognitive frames constitute barriers to
change (see also Gersick, 1991). Thus, as iterative factors, habits link the past to the
present and so provide stability and continuity in social life.
Given the above analyses, the neglect of the logic of habit by the existing models
of path dependence becomes quite surprising: compared with other logics of action
(i.e. consequences and appropriateness), the logic of habit, with its iterative,
self-reinforcing, reproductive nature, is even more conducive to behavioral lock-in
and so to path dependence.
Features of habitual path dependence
Habitual path dependence entails some of the deﬁning features of the classical
conception of path dependence. In that understanding, a path-dependent process
should have the following properties: unpredictability, inﬂexibility, non-ergodicity,
and potential inefﬁciency (e.g. see Arthur, 1994: 112–113; Mahoney, 2000:
510–511; Pierson, 2000: 253).10 Unpredictability is related to the presence of
multiple choices or equilibria at the initial conditions. Because early events are
treated as stochastic, contingent occurrences, it is difﬁcult to predict which option
will be chosen and lock itself in. In Goldstone’s words, ‘[p]ath dependence is a
property of a system such that the outcome over a period of time is not determined
10 This approach suggests that not all persistencies, continuities, or patterns qualify for path depen-
dence. For a discussion on the differences and similarities between path dependence and other forms of
continuities or persistencies such as ‘imprinting’, ‘escalating commitment’, and ‘structural inertia’, see
Sydow et al. (2009).
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by any particular set of initial conditions. Rather, a system that exhibits path
dependence is one in which outcomes are related stochastically to initial conditions’
(1998: 834). Similarly, Mahoney and Schensul observe that several path analyses
argue that the events that characterize a critical juncture period are contingent. In
particular, they suggest that the selection of a particular option during a critical
juncture represents a random happening, an accident, a small occurrence, or an
event that cannot be explained or predicted on the basis of a particular theoretical
framework (2006: 461).
Contingency, which is considered a necessary condition for path dependence, is
also relevant to habitual paths. At critical junctures or moments, a variety of actions
or choices are available for human agents, and any one might be chosen. In other
words, it is difﬁcult to predict which behavior will be habituated and lock itself in.
Thus, habitual paths might also emerge out of contingent or stochastic events and
conditions.
Inﬂexibility means that once a path is chosen, it becomes difﬁcult for agents to
return to initial conditions or to shift to another path. Mahoney asserts that ‘once
contingent historical events take place, path-dependent sequences are marked by
relatively deterministic causal patterns or what can be thought of as “inertia” that
is, once processes are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these
processes tend to stay in motion and continue to track this outcome’ (2000: 511).
Habitual routines are also difﬁcult to break (see below).
Non-ergodicity means that small, random occurrences early in a sequence of
events do not cancel out; rather, such events have a long-lasting impact on future
choices or events (Arthur, 1994; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). This feature is
also relevant for habitual paths. Early events or developments in the process of
habituation have greater determinative impact on which choice is routinized.
Potential inefﬁciency suggests that the path chosen by agents may not be the most
efﬁcient choice. In other words, despite conventional economic models, which
assume that rational actors make the most efﬁcient decisions to maximize utilities,
sub-optimal, inefﬁcient outcomes or paths (e.g. the QWERTY keyboard layout)
might also lock themselves in (see David, 1985; Arthur, 1990). Potential path
inefﬁciency is relevant to habitual path dependence simply because, as indicated
above, efﬁciency is not really the issue in the case of habitual human conduct; such
conduct is primarily unreﬂective, non-deliberative, dispositional, and automatic.
Thus, optimal and/or sub-optimal options or actions can be habituated by human
agents (see also Barnes et al., 2004; Hopf, 2010).
Another important feature of path dependence is related to the distinction
between productive and reproductive processes. In a path-dependent process,
institutional patterns or paths are expected to reproduce themselves even in the
absence of the recurrence of the circumstances, conditions, or factors that generated
that path in the ﬁrst place (see Stinchcombe, 1968: 102–103; Mahoney, 2000:
515; Pierson, 2000). Pierson, for instance, notes that ‘some original ordering
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moment triggers particular patterns, and the activity is continuously reproduced
even though the original event no longer occurs’ (2000: 263). Thus, for the path-
dependence approach, brief, sudden, exogenous, contingent events are responsible
for path initiation or production. However, once created, paths tend to reproduce
themselves in the absence of those original events or conditions. This feature is
valid to habitual path dependence as well. Once an option is habituated and
routinized, it becomes part of social and political structures. Even if the agents do
not remember the original conditions or factors that facilitated the habituation of
that path, the logic of habit or practical reason reinforces that option, leading to
stasis or dormancy.
Breaking habitual paths
What about change? How does change take place in the case of habitual paths?
Similar to the existing types of paths, habitual paths are also sticky and thus difﬁcult
to change simply because habits tend to reinforce the status quo. Weber also
stressed the tendency toward inertia in habitual human conduct, stating that ‘the
inner disposition (Eingestelltheit) [to continue along as one has regularly done]
contains in itself [such] tangible inhibitions against “innovations”’ (quoted in
Camic, 1986: 1059). Therefore, as Hopf notes ‘[a]ny efforts to change have to ﬁrst
overcome the power of habitual perceptions, emotions, and practices’ (2010: 561).
Although it is difﬁcult to break habits, change still occurs in the habitual world.
Habits are formed and reformed. How, then, do agents break away from habitual
paths? Hopf suggests that habits themselves do not produce change, but that when
agents start to reﬂect on habits, then change becomes more likely.11 Reﬂecting on
habits is not easy, however: ‘breaking habits requires reﬂection, but getting people
to reﬂect, when they are comfortably situated in institutions that protect them from
any dissonant voices, is difﬁcult and rare’ (Hopf, 2010: 555).
If reﬂection is important for change, then, when and how do agents become
more reﬂective about habitual routines? The account of change provided by
the conventional understanding of path dependence seems to be relevant to this
question. The traditional approach expects change to be incremental, evolutionary,
or path following (i.e. within-path or on-path change; see Krasner, 1988; North,
1990: 99; Levi, 1990: 415; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Mahoney, 2001; Torﬁng,
2001; Cox, 2004; Pierson, 2004: 153). Path-breaking change is treated as a rare
event, occurring after long periods of stability and continuity. Such major changes
are expected to take place at critical junctures or periods, when some stochastic,
unexpected events, or disturbances (e.g. war, economic crises, dramatic technolo-
gical developments, natural disasters, and epidemics) disrupt the existing path or
equilibrium and create a new one (i.e. a new period of stasis; Arthur, 1994: 34,
11 In the organizational context, Sydow et al. (2009: 702) also draw attention to the positive role of
‘critical reﬂection’ in path-breaking change.
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44–45; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Mahoney, 2000: 513; Pierson, 2000: 253;
Alexander, 2001: 254; Greener, 2005; Soifer, 2012). This process is also called
‘punctuated equilibrium’: a long period of continuity or stability (i.e. equilibrium)
is punctuated by abrupt, sudden, contingent, metamorphic developments, or
events at critical junctures, which generate a new path (see Krasner, 1984, 1988;
Ikenberry, 1988; Collier and Collier, 1991; Gersick, 1991; Baumgartner and
Jones, 1993).
Criticizing the conventional punctuated model of path-breaking change,
several recent studies draw attention to the signiﬁcance of minor, incremental
changes, which may have major (i.e. path-breaking) consequences in the long run
(e.g. Thelen, 2003; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Pierre et al., 2008; Mahoney and
Thelen, 2010). For instance, Streeck and Thelen suggest that ‘far-reaching change
can be accomplished through the accumulation of small, often seemingly insignif-
icant adjustments’ (2005: 8). Thus, it is expected that slow-moving, transformative
processes (i.e. a series of piecemeal and gradual changes or adjustments) in times
of stability are likely to accumulate into a new institutional equilibrium or a new,
self-reinforcing, stationary path over an extended period of time. In other words,
the amassment of continuous, incremental changes might result in substantial
structural changes (see also Rose and Davies, 1994; Pierson, 2003, 2004; Berkman
and Reenock, 2004: 799; Kay, 2005: 566; Boas, 2007).
Both the abrupt (i.e. punctuation of institutional paths or equilibria at critical
junctures) and incremental models of change presented above are applicable to
habitual paths. Endogenous or exogenous shocks or events at critical junctures or
moments, which are deﬁned as ‘relatively short periods of time during which there is
a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome
of interest’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 348), are likely to make agents more
conscious, deliberative, and reﬂective. Agents’ reﬂections, in return, would chal-
lenge habitual perceptions, attitudes, and practices, and so enhance the likelihood of
breaking away from existing habitual routines. Bourdieu (1977: 168–169) also
acknowledges that although rare, crisis moments or situations, that involve
major political and economic unrests, are likely to halt doxa (i.e. habit) from
functioning as a basis for action. Thus, critical junctures also facilitate path-
breaking change in the case of habitual paths by facilitating agents’ conscious
deliberation and contestation. Once a critical juncture paves the way for a new
choice or action, agents would habituate it through time and a new habitual path
would lock itself in.
Habits may also adapt themselves to new situations slowly and unconsciously
(see Swartz, 2002: 66). Marginal groups and their counter-hegemonic voices are
particularly likely to play a key role in the gradual change of habitual routines.
As Clemens and Cook state ‘[g]roups marginal to the political system are more
likely to thinker [sic] with institutions… Denied the social beneﬁts of current insti-
tutional conﬁgurations, marginal groups have fewer costs associated with deviating
from those conﬁgurations’ (1999: 452; see also Pierson, 2004; Hopf, 2010).
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Regarding the source of change, either spontaneous and unreﬂective processes or
deliberate choices might drive habitual change (Crossley, 2013: 150).
In sum, although habitual path dependence shares several features with the utili-
tarian and normative models of path dependence, it has quite different assumptions
with respect to the prevailing conception of human agency and the mechanisms of
path reproduction (see Table 2). Although utilitarian and normative models assume
agency to be deliberative, teleological, and reﬂective, in the habitual model, human
agency is assumed to be unreﬂective, non-deliberative, dispositional, and insentient.
Another major difference is related to the mechanisms of reproduction. In the habitual
model, path continuity or path maintenance is based on habituation or habitual
lock-in rather than utilitarian or normative lock-in.Otherwise stated, path dependence
in the habitual model is not because of utilitarian or normative concerns but to largely
insentient, dispositional habituation.
Final discussion
In the last decades, the concept of path dependence has become a highly popular
notion in the social sciences, used extensively in institutional and policy analyses.
Despite its popularity, however, the notion of path dependence suffers from its
own limitations. As shown above, path dependence remains limited owing to the
oversight of the role of habitual routines by the existing path-dependence literature.
Moreover, the existing models consider agency as reﬂective and deliberative,
disregarding its non-reﬂective, non-strategic, and dispositional aspects. By illuminat-
ing, elaborating on, and clarifying the existing models or variants of path dependence
and by adding a novel one (i.e. habitual path dependence), this study is expected to
contribute to a more-conscious and so more-fruitful usage of the path-dependence
approach in scholarly research.
The notion of the ‘habitual path’ introduced by this study as a complementary but
analytically distinct model of path dependence would certainly enrich the analytical
content of the path-dependence approach. One might still, however, raise the
following question: How and when would the notion of habitual path dependence
Table 2. A comparison of habitual path dependence with utilitarian and normative
models
Model Logic of action Prevailing conception of agency Mechanism of reproduction
I: Utilitarian Consequentiality Deliberative, teleological,
reﬂective, sentient, strategic
Increasing returns (utilitarian
lock-in)
II: Normative Appropriateness Deliberative, teleological,
reﬂective, sentient
Legitimation (ideational,
normative lock-in)
III: Habitual Habit/practicality Unreﬂective, non-deliberative,
non-strategic, insentient,
dispositional
Habituation (habitual lock-in)
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be useful for institutional and policy analyses? Several studies have already shown
that the logic of habit improves our understanding of many patterns and con-
tinuities in world politics, such as diplomacy, cooperation, security communities,
security dilemmas, and enduring rivalries and enmities (see Pouliot, 2008;
Hopf, 2010). Regarding domestic politics, this notion would be useful particularly
for analyzing formal and informal institutional patterns of path dependence.
As suggested above, most formal institutions involve habitual elements such as
internalized dispositions, routines, schemas, traditions, customs, and conventions.
Thus, habitual path dependence is quite pertinent to the study of political processes
and outcomes in formalized institutional settings (e.g. legislatures, political parties,
courts, and bureaucracies).
Habitual path dependence remains even more relevant for the analysis of infor-
mal institutions, which are deﬁned as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that
are created, communicated, and enforced outside of ofﬁcially sanctioned channels’
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). It is undeniable that informal institutional
elements such as political legacies, heritages, traditions, customs, and conventions
substantially mold political life in various ways in several domains (e.g. see North,
1990; Lauth, 2000; Stacey and Rittberger, 2003; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004,
2006; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Ingraham et al., 2008; Painter and Peters, 2010).
Furthermore, as indicated above, many highly formalized institutional or organi-
zational structures also entail informal rules and practices, molding formal pro-
cesses (e.g. see Lauth, 2000; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, 2006). Although informal
institutions (e.g. diplomacy, consociationalism, custom law, clientalism, patronage,
bribery, patrimonialism, nepotism, tribalism, and militarism) are quite prevalent in
the political world, they are largely ignored by institutional approaches. As Helmke
and Levitsky note,
informal rules have remained at the margins of the institutionalist turn in com-
parative politics. Indeed, much current literature assumes that actors’ incentives
and expectations are shaped primarily, if not exclusively, by formal rules. Such a
narrow focus can be problematic, for it risks missing much of what drives political
behavior and can hinder efforts to explain important political phenomena (2004:
725–726).
If comparative research on political institutions needs to pay greater attention to
the role of informal institutions, then, the notion of habitual path dependence, as a
possible theoretical framework, has great potential to contribute to such efforts
because compared with formal institutions, informal institutions, which are treated
as ‘unwritten codes embedded in everyday social practice’ (Bratton, 2007: 96),
involve relatively stronger habitual dimensions.
Habitual path dependence seems to have another potential beneﬁt in terms of
studying informal institutions. Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 734) rightly indicate
that more theorizing is necessary about the emergence of informal institutions
(particularly the mechanisms through which informal rules are created) and about
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the sources of informal institutional stability and change. The use of the logic of
habit and habituation would be quite rewarding, particularly for analyzing the
persistence of informal institutions. The notion of the habitual path would also be
helpful in terms of understanding the gap between formal and informal institutional
change. Institutional perspectives are content to merely acknowledge that formal
institutions change relatively easily compared with informal institutions (e.g. North,
1990; Lauth, 2000); the ideas of habituation and habitual lock-in associated with
the notion of the habitual path could shed some light as to why.
A counter-argument might suggest that the normative model does recognize
the role of habits and routines. Indeed, March and Olsen (1984, 1989, 1998)
acknowledge the role of rituals, ceremonies, and traditions in the institutional
world. I have three responses to such a counter-argument. First, I believe that the
normative model does not do justice to habitual routines; they deserve more than a
mere acknowledgement. As Weber’s (1978) typology of social action also suggests,
the logic of habit and habitually accustomed actions are distinct enough not to be
subsumed under a logic of appropriateness (the former is dispositional; the latter is
more conscious, deliberative, and reﬂective; see also Hopf, 2002: 12; Pouliot,
2008). Thus, it is neither accurate nor useful to include two analytically distinct
elements (i.e. highly routinized, dispositional ‘habitual/practical action’, and con-
scious, reﬂective ‘normative action’) into a single framework.
Second, of the two logics of action (i.e. habit and appropriateness), the logic of
habit is more distinct from the logic of consequentiality (see also Hopf, 2010).
Although the logic of appropriateness was proposed as an alternative to the logic of
consequences, several analysts treat them as similar logics of social action.
For instance, it is suggested that complying with the rules and norms in a given
institutional environment and acting ‘appropriately’ to avoid certain costs (e.g.
opprobrium) should be a very rational action (see Goldfarb and Grifﬁth, 1991;
Goertz and Diehl, 1992: 637; Noll and Weingast, 1991: 237). Thus, for several
scholars, actors’ ideational concerns might be easily incorporated into a rational
cost-beneﬁt calculation. Ostrom, for instance, states that
recognizing the importance of rules and social norms is not inconsistent with a
rational-choice interpretation of individual action within the constraints of a rule-
ordered set of relationships…
To be rule-governed, the rational individual must know the rules of the games in
which choices are made and how to participate in the crafting of rules to constitute
better games (1991: 240, 241).
Schimmelfennig also suggests that ‘in an institutional environment, it can be the
rational choice to behave appropriately’ (2000: 116). Similarly, Goldmann (2005)
maintains that far from being mutually exclusive, these two logics overlap con-
siderably. Pouliot concurs, stating that ‘norm-based actions stem from a process of
reﬂexive cognition based either on instrumental calculations, reasoned persuasion,
or the psychology of compliance’ (2008: 262).
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Third, the habitual model has an advantage over the normative model. The latter
remains one-sided owing to its bias toward socially accepted or legitimate rules and
behavior. For instance, March and Olsen (1998: 951) suggest that appropriateness
involves an ethical dimension, which is that an appropriate action should be
‘virtuous’. Focusing on actions conforming to moral or ethical norms and principles
in a social order, this model tends to ignore the patterns or continuities constituted
by ‘inappropriate’ or ‘illegitimate’ actions such as nepotism, bribery, militarism,
patrimonialism, and patronage. As indicated above, although such informal rules
also play a major role in the political world, the normative model is almost silent
on them. This situation exists partly because, similar to the utilitarian model,
the normative model is also based on representational knowledge. Treated as
conscious, verbalizable, and intentional, ‘representational knowledge’ is associated
with reﬂexive cognition: ‘In situation X, you should do Y’ (owing to either
utilitarian or normative motivations). The habitual model, on the other hand, is
based on ‘practical knowledge’, which is tacit, inarticulate, and automatic. Practical
knowledge is based on unreﬂexive cognition: ‘In situation X, action Y follows’
(see Hopf, 2002: 12; Pouliot, 2008: 270–271). Such a distinction implies that the
habitual model, based on practical knowledge, does not have a normative bias.
It acknowledges the possibility that in a social setting, agents might also habituate
so-called ‘inappropriate’ actions. In other words, the logic of habit/practicality
does not have any utilitarian or normative bias. Therefore, the habitual model is
relatively more advantageous for dealing with such continuities or patterns in the
institutional world.
In brief, at this early stage of theorizing, it appears that the notion of habitual path
dependence would increase the explanatory potential of path dependence and
consequently better contribute to our understanding of institutional and policy
patterns or continuities involving path-dependent processes andmechanisms. At the
very least, it would enrich our conceptual and theoretical toolboxes and so further
empower us in dealing with various forms of historical causality. Therefore, further
conceptual and theoretical reﬂection on the habitual model of path dependence and
its employment in empirical research would be worthwhile for institutional per-
spectives. Some of the challenging questions or issues to be addressed in future
research are as follows: When and under what conditions does habituation or the
acquisition of habits take place and generate self-reinforcing habitual paths in the
social and political worlds? Why do agents habituate a particular option or policy
but not another one? How does the logic of habit interact with other logics?
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